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TO "BRING DOWN THE FLOWERS":' THE CULTURAL
CONTEXT OF ABORTION LAW IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND
CARLA SPIVACK*
ABSTRACT
This article takes issue with claims made by Joseph Dellapenna
in his 2006 book, Dispelling the Myths of Abortion History, which
claims to correct the "distortions of the history" of abortion law under-
lying Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Dellapenna argues that, con-
trary to Justice Blackmun's historic analysis in Roe, "abortion was
considered a serious crime throughout most of European history" and
that "courts did... punish abortions before quickening during the
Middle Ages." This article shows that Dellapenna's argument relies
on serious misreading of cases and ignorance of the relevant his-
torical, medical, and cultural context, and that pre-quickening or
intra-marital self-induced abortion was of little concern to the law.
First, the author describes the fear of social disorder that per-
vaded society at this time, and shows that contemporary thinkers
traced this perceived disorder to women and illicit sex. Thus, their
concerns with abortion were based on its providing a means to enable
or conceal extra-marital sex, not on any condemnation of abortion per
se. Next, the article discusses the contemporary medical context, and
examines medical and midwife manuals to show that the early-stage
fetus was not accorded full human status.
The article then turns to the legal context, reviewing abortion law
from the time of the earliest Anglo-Saxon laws, and reviews specific
cases, many of which are cited by Dellapenna. It shows that most of
the cases he cites in support of the illegality of abortion are in fact tort
cases brought by pregnant women against people who had assaulted
them, causing the loss of a fetus in the process. These cases thus offer
1. ANGUS MCLAREN, REPRODUCTIVE RITUALS: THE PERCEPTION OF FERTILITY IN
ENGLAND FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 102 (1984).
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no evidence of the illegality of abortion. The article argues overall that
the structure of the common law was not meant to capture incidents
of intra-marital abortion. With respect to the Church courts, cases
examined in detail in the article show the same tort characteristics
or concern with illicit sex, as with the common law court cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Joseph Dellapenna, Professor of Law at Villanova
University School of Law,2 published a book called Dispelling the
Myths of Abortion History, in which he claims to correct the "distor-
tions of the history"3 of abortion law underlying Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).' Contrary to Justice Blackmun's conclusions in Roe,5
and to Cyril Mean's interpretation of English law informing those
conclusions,6 Dellapenna claims that "[a]bortion was considered a
serious crime throughout most of European history" and that "courts
did... punish abortions before quickening during the Middle Ages."'
Dellapenna's book is a recent example of analysis which distorts the
evidence to press an absolutist position about the legal history, ignor-
ing context and culture to do so. Bypassing the importance of intellec-
tual and social history to an understanding of the law,' Dellapenna
2. Villanova University School of Law Faculty Profiles, http://old.law.villanova.edu/
faculty/facultyprofiles/faculty/dellapennadellapenna.asp (last visited Sept. 3, 2007).
3. JOSEPH W. DELLAPENNA, DISPELLING THE MYTHS OFABORTION HISTORY xii (2006).
4. Id. at xi.
5. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-36 (1973).
6. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or
Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes
of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971).
7. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 18, 260.
8. See generally William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to
American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1065 (1997) (discussing how recent American legal historians have been influenced by
four methodologies (Structuralism, Contextualism, Textualism, and New Historicism)
developed by intellectual historians).
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himself falsifies the record. His historical coverage is broad,9 and
this article responds only to his discussion of fifteenth- through
seventeenth-century England; I leave his analysis of early American
law to those more qualified in that field. An examination of the law's
cultural context in early modern England establishes that abortion
before quickening generally was not "a serious crime,"' 0 and the feudal
appeals system, wherein women were only permitted to prosecute
felony appeals based on "the murder of her husband in her arms,
rape, and abortion," on which Dellapenna bases much of his argu-
ment, fails to support his claims." Moreover, whether abortion was
a crime at all depended on who performed the procedure, and under
what circumstances.
12
What this article investigates is the culture - folklore, popular
beliefs, and attitudes of society as a whole - surrounding the act of
self-induced abortion in early modern England. Despite growing
acknowledgment that statutes and case law are better understood as
part of the culture in which they are embedded, 3 no one has yet
applied such a methodology to this topic. Some scholars have exam-
ined the history of abortion and contraception, 14 and many on both
sides argue about the legal history of abortion as it appears in cases
and statutes. 15 This article seeks to combine these two approaches by
reading the relevant legal texts alongside other cultural texts pertain-
ing to the issue, such as midwife manuals, medical books, pamphlets
about crime, and even works of literature. This article will also draw
on contemporary beliefs about the body, sex, sin, public and private
spheres, pregnancy, and fetal formation to draw a full contextual
picture.
A nuanced and shifting landscape emerges from this investiga-
tion. As the debates over this issue have shown, both sides can muster
evidence: there is case law - albeit very little - that seems to classify
abortion as murder without reference to stages of fetal development, 6
and there are cases and other material which seem to regard abortion
as less serious, some appearing to disregard it altogether. 7 Part of the
reason for this very real confusion is that medieval and early modern
9. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at xi.
10. Contra id. at 18.
11. See id. at 131, 135-36.
12. MCLAREN, supra note 1, at 107.
13. See generally Fisher, supra note 8, at 1068.
14. See, e.g., AUDREY ECCLES, OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY IN TUDOR AND STUART
ENGLAND (1982); MCLAREN, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., DELLAPENNA, supra note 3; Means, supra note 6.
16. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 138-39.
17. Means, supra note 6, at 341.
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England did not have a single unified legal system," though one was
evolving: law was still partly related to local custom and could vary
from place to place;' 9 multiple court systems were in play;2 ° ecclesi-
astical law and common law had contested and at times overlapping
jurisdiction.2 At the level of enforcement - often this is all the records
show us - officers of the law were "often partisan or highly erratic in
their performance." 22 These factors make it difficult to establish the
conclusive answers each side in the modern abortion debate seeks.
Rather, therefore, than taking part in this "either-or" polemic, this
article tries to reconcile seemingly contradictory evidence by putting
it in its cultural context and letting the full picture, in all its com-
plexity and ambiguity, emerge.
Ultimately, this article will make several claims. First, I show
that the term "abortion" had a different meaning in early modern
England from the one we give it today,23 and this difference itself is
important to understanding the texts and statutes. I will also show,
based on an analysis of the early modern system of bringing appeals
to prosecute serious crimes, that cases in which women brought claims
against men who had injured fetuses they were carrying are not abor-
tion cases in any modern sense24 and cannot be used to make a claim
that self-induced abortion was illegal or that the law ascribed any
legal personhood to the fetus. Rather, these cases resemble modern
torts and are based on recognition of the injury done to the woman.25
This misguided reading of these cases is one of the assumptions under-
lying Dellapenna's argument.26 I also argue that, to whatever extent
the law - secular and ecclesiastical - did frown on abortion, it sub-
sumed this concern within the much greater concern with illicit sex
and illegitimacy and imposed counter-measures to punish abortion
in a context in which it served to hide, and enable, sex outside of
marriage. Dellapenna ignores this important context, but under-
standing attitudes to abortion in this age is impossible without that
background. As a corollary to the previous point, I show that abortion
within marriage, performed by women as a means of birth control,
18. GREGORY DURSTON, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND: 1500-1750,
at 304 (2004).
19. See id. at 422.
20. See id. at 435.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 19.
23. See MCLAREN, supra note 1, at 89-112.
24. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 133.
25. See id. at 137.
26. Id. at 135.
27. See FRANCES E. DOLAN, DANGEROUS FAMILIARS: REPRESENTATIONS OF DOMESTIC
CRIME IN ENGLAND, 1550-1700, at 136 (1994).
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was largely outside of the purview of the law, for both structural and
cultural reasons.28
The marginal place of such intra-marital abortion in relation to
the legal system has contributed to its obscurity as a subject for study,
but here I argue that this marginality itself, and its implications for
privacy and the purview of the legal regime, is key to understanding
it. Most importantly, perhaps, I will show that the pre-quickening
fetus, though understood to be alive, was not considered a person in
any legal, cultural, or even biological sense; that this theme appears
in legal texts and midwife manuals as early as Anglo-Saxon times; and
that this premise was consistent with early modern views of humanity
and personhood.29 Finally, I will show that early modern notions of the
body made induced menstruation - "bring[ing] down the flowers" 30 -
an acceptable form of early-term, intra-marital abortion.31
In Part I, I will clarify definitions, showing how the early modern
definition of the term "abortion" differs from the modern one. Part II
lays out the sixteenth-century social and medical context, which I
assert is crucial to understanding all of the period's laws touching
illicit sexuality. First, this discussion will reveal that society was per-
vaded by a fear of disorder, and this disorder was embodied in illicit
female sexuality, and its resultant illegitimate children. The cultural-
medical context, including medical textbooks, midwive's manuals,
records of the experience of pregnancy and of the body generally, and
literary works, sheds light on this discussion, indicating that a fetus
in its early stages was not accorded full human status. Part II gives a
brief overview of the relevant legal texts, the role of the ecclesiastical
courts, and discusses the structural features of the early common law
that militate against the prosecution of intra-marital self-induced
abortion. Scholars have exhaustively debated the meaning of these
texts elsewhere,32 and my only concern here is to shed whatever addi-
tional light on them I can by situating them in their cultural and
28. See Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261,286 (1992) (establish-
ing that abortion within marriage as a form of birth control was not regulated by the law).
29. See, e.g., TROTULA OF SALERNO, THE DISEASES OF WOMEN 19-20 (Elizabeth Mason-
Hohl trans., Ward Ritchie Press 1940) (1547) (describing an unborn human as a "child"
beginning in the eighth month of gestation); PERCIVAL WILLUGHBY, OBSERVATIONS IN
MIDWIFERY 263 (Henry Blenkinsop ed., S.R. Publishers 1972) (1863) (distinguishing
abortion, or "sudden exclusion of the child, already formed, and alive, before the perfect
maturity thereof," from effluxion, or "the falling down of seeds mixed together, and
coagulated but for the space of a few days").
30. MCLAREN, supra note 1, at 102.
31. Id. at 107.
32. See, e.g., MARK JACKSON, NEW-BORN CHILD MURDER: WOMEN, ILLEGITIMACY AND
THE COURTS IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 47-51 (1996); MCLAREN, supra note 1,
at 94.
20071
112 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:107
historical moment. Specifically, I will discuss the term in rerum
natura in light of contemporary ideas about human reason and chal-
lenge the claim that it refers merely to a problem of scientific evidence.
As to the structure of common law, I make some fundamental points
about its organization, suggesting that it was not set up to capture
incidents of marital abortion, and that this was inherent to its sepa-
ration between public and private, masculine and feminine.
I. DEFINITIONS
The word "abortion" per se did not necessarily denote an illegal
act, or, indeed, any intentional act at all.33 Rather, it was a physical
fact, a risk incidental to pregnancy, usually occurring fairly late in
gestation.34 According to Percival Willughby, a seventeenth-century
physician and male midwife,35 abortion was "the sudden exclusion
of the child, already formed, and alive, before the perfect maturity
thereof."36 Abortion occurs when "the conception ... perish[es] in
the womb, and, being turned into a putrid matter, ... glide[s], and
issue[s] forth ... and this, both in women, and other animals."37
Francis Mauriceau, author of a midwife's manual in 1710,38 defined
it this way:
When a Woman casts forth in the Beginning what she had
retained by Conception in the Womb, 'tis called an Effluxion, or
a sliding away of the Seeds, because they have not yet acquir'd
any solid Substance: If they miscarry of a false Conception, which
is ordinarily from the latter end of the first to the end of the second
Month, it is called an Expulsion; but when the Infant is already
formed, and begins to live, if it comes before the time ordain'd and
prescrib'd by Nature, it is an Abortion ....
Abortion was something to be prevented: Trotula of Salerno
advises that parsley, mint, cardamom, and a few other herbs, in "a
very fine powder.., prevents abortion if properly taken."40 She also
states that "[t]o prevent abortion which is accustomed to happen in
the seventh or before the ninth month, we take oil, wax, powder of
33. See SALERNO, supra note 29, at 39.
34. See id.
35. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 69.
36. WILLUGHBY, supra note 29, at 263.
37. Id.
38. FRANCIS MAuRIcEAU, THE DISEASES OF WOMEN WITH CHILD, AND IN CHILD-BED
(Randolph Trumbach ed., Garland Publ'g 1985) (1710).
39. Id. at 110.
40. SALERNO, supra note 29, at 21.
TO "BRING DOWN THE FLOWERS"
incense, and mastic; mix and anoint the woman before and behind
two or three times a week."41 Again, in The Byrth of Mankynde,
Eucharius Rbsslin devotes a chapter to prevention of "abortementes
or untymely birthes," 42 which he defines as synonymous, meaning
"when the woman is delyvered before due season & before the frute be
rype ... before the byrth have lyfe, & sumtymes after it hath lyfe...
beynge by some chaunse dead in the mothers wombe." 4
The term the manuals use for the destruction of a fetus early in
the pregnancy, intentional or not, was miscarriage.44 A woman could
procure a miscarriage, although miscarriages could come about by
accident and were generally feared and protected against.45 The fact
that the term miscarriage encompassed both a natural function and
an effect intentionally brought about is important to understanding
its meaning." There is no notion of murder, or even killing, although
the understanding is evident that procuring a miscarriage could
terminate a pregnancy.47
II. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONTEXT
A. The Fear of Disorder
The early modern period in England was a time of great anxiety
about the threats to the social order represented by illicit sexual
activity.48 A basis in fact for these anxieties existed: late Tudor and
early Stuart England saw increasing poverty, a succession of bad
harvests, inadequate marriage laws, and strict enforcement of parish
boundaries, forcing many onto the road;49 illegitimacy rates peaked
around the turn of the century.50 This is an important part of the
context for laws regulating women's reproduction, and laws about
41. Id. at 39.
42. EUCHARIUSROSSLIN, THE BYRTH OF MANKYNDE: OTHERWYSE NAMED THE WOMANS
BOOKE fol.85 (Classics of Med. Library 1994) (1514).
43. Id.
44. See MAURICEAU, supra note 38, at 110. Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803, the first
law against abortion before quickening, was also the first statute to use the word
"abortion." BERNARD M. DICKENS, ABORTION AND THE LAW 23-25 (1966).
45. See MCLAREN, supra note 1, at 46-49.
46. See id. at 46-49, 89-112.
47. See id. at 89-112.
48. PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, MURDERING MOTHERS: INFANTICIDE IN ENGLAND
AND NEW ENGLAND 1558-1803, at 12 (1984). See generally, A.L. BEIER, MASTERLESS MEN:
THE VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND 1560-1640 (1985) (discussing the vagrancy laws of
the Tudor and early Stuart reigns).
49. BEIER, supra note 48, at 53.
50. Id.
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abortion address this broader concern more than the isolated act.
Though illegitimacy rates were highest between 1590 and 1610, it
remained a disruptive social force throughout the period.5' Laws regu-
lating women's sexuality must be seen in this context: their objects of
concern were the female poor, vagrants, and unmarried, whose sexual
incontinence corresponded to their male counterparts' thievery and
violence.52 One writer described the male vagabond as "a wily fox,"53
presumably in his ability to commit crimes by stealth and deceit, and
the female as "a cow.., that goes to bull every moon, with what bull
she cares not." 5 4 Contemporaries viewed vagrants as embodying a
threat to the status quo, each sex in its own particular way.55 These
concerns to an extent reflected reality: families of the middling sort -
i.e., vulnerable to economic fluctuations - were in crisis by 1610,56
and that year saw the passage of a law making it a felony to desert
one's family.5" In short, there were "[c]ontemporary preoccupations
with unmarried women and with the fate of their illegitimate children
[that] stemmed from a variety of factors,... perhaps most impor-
tantly[] from fears about the financial burden of increasing numbers
of illegitimate children."58
Specifically, as A.L. Beier points out, "[v]agrants were a menace
to the social order because they broke with the accepted norms of
family life."59 These norms were patriarchal, involving marriage, a
stable set of kin, and a household - in other words, controlling sex-
uality.' The source of the disorder vagrants embodied was unlicensed
sex.6 ' One pamphleteer wrote in 1616 that vagrants were "a promis-
cuous generation, who are all of kin, and yet know no kindred, no
house or home, no law but their sensual lust."62 The Elizabethan and
Jacobean years saw the attempted passage of many bills on adultery,
fornication, and bastardy, although most of them failed due to con-
cerns that their wide nets might catch those of "quality" as well as
lower-class individuals. One that did make it was the 1576 "Poor
51. SUSAN DWYER AMUSSEN, AN ORDERED SOCIETY: GENDER AND CLASS IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND ill (1988).
52. See BEIER, supra note 48, at 53.
53. Id. at 7 (quoting Thomas Harman).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 7-9.
56. Id. at 52.
57. Id.
58. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 29.
59. BEIER, supra note 48, at 51.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 65-67.
62. Id. at 51 (quoting John Downame).
63. MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570-1640,
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Law" that punished those who tried to palm off illegitimate children
on the parish 4 and a 1609 law calling bastardy a "great charge" to
the nation.6" Marital and family stability were seen as essential to
maintaining order in society; the family was a commonwealth in
microcosm.66 Anxiety about precisely this - the stability of families
and their control of sexuality - began to grow in the middle of the
sixteenth century. 7
The sexual aspect of vagrancy was seen as particularly female:
female vagrants were generally charged with prostitution while males
were more likely to be charged with vagrancy.' As Amussen points
out, the birth of an illegitimate child challenged the social and gender
order by creating a "household with neither communal approval, fi-
nancial security nor a father to govern it."6 9 Illegitimacy was a danger
for reasons other than those of cultural prejudice, however: Peter
Laslett speculates that premarital sexuality was tightly controlled
because of the need to prevent the population from outstripping the
society's resources.7 °
Many broken families came about through abandonment by the
male partner. 71 In addition to deserted wives looking for their hus-
bands, vagrant women fell into two other categories: prostitutes and
unmarried pregnant girls.72 Indeed, Beier speculates that "[t]he preg-
nant girl without means or a husband must have been a common
sight in Tudor and early Stuart times."73
at 152 (1987).
64. An Acte for the Setting of the Poore on Worke, and for the Avoyding of Ydleness
1576, 18 Eliz., c. 3 (Eng.).
65. An Acte for the Due Execucion of Divers Laws and Statutes Heretofore Made
Against Rogues Vagabonde and Sturdye Beggars and Other Lewde and Idle Persons,
1609, 7 Jac. I, c. 4 (Eng.).
66. In his 1622 guide to family life, William Gouge reminds his readers how "[n]eces-
sary it is that good order be first set in families: for as they were before other polities, so
they are somewhat the more necessary: and good members of a family are like to make
good members of Church and common-wealth." WILLIAM GOUGE, OF DOMESTICALL DUTIES:
EIGHT TREATISES 3 (1622).
67. INGRAM, supra note 63, at 125.
68. BEIER, supra note 48, at 52.
69. AMUSSEN, supra note 51, at 111.
70. See Peter Laslett, Introduction to BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY:
STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ILLEGITIMACY AND MARITAL NONCONFORMISM IN BRITAIN,
FRANCE, GERMANY, SWEDEN, NORTH AMERICA, JAMAICA AND JAPAN 1, 63 (Peter Laslett
et al. eds., 1980) (suggesting that illegitimacy was viewed as a "dangerous liability by
everyone" in "times of really desperate shortage").
71. See BEIER, supra note 48, at 52 (noting that "[one in every 12 female adult beggars
in Warwick in 1587 had been abandoned" by a male partner).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 53.
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The popular literature of the day also makes clear the association
of abortion with illicit sex.74 The pamphlet Deeds Against Nature and
Monsters by Kinde tells the story of Martha Scambler, a prostitute
facing an unwanted pregnancy who tries to procure an abortion. 75 The
author tells us that "the harlot (delighting in shame and sinne) makes
no conscience to be the butcher of her owne seed, nay the Image of
God created in her owne body, and now and then in the conception
makes spoyle of the bed of creation before it can receive true forme. '
This is an especially telling example because, as we have seen, it is
one of the few texts that seems to condemn abortion at a very early
stage - "before it can receive true forme."77 The writer connects this
condemnation with the woman's sinful life: she delights in "shame
and sinne" 78 overall; her destruction of her unborn child is only one
example.79
Increasingly in this period, courts became fora for regulating
disorder and social life in general, 0 and several cases like Martha
Scambler's make clear that sexual disorder, rather than abortion
itself, was the root of the concern."1 For example, the charge against
Margaret Manister in 1572 was incest and illicit sex:
[She] lay in bed with one John Gyver being her husband's brother
night by night, sometimes in his clothes and sometimes in his
shirt, and one Thomas Browne did lie with her for the space of one
week, and then she lay in a chamber severally with herself, and
then the said Browne broke though the solar boards to her, but
she called for no rescue and drank saven, and that night she fell
sick and so was the whole week after.8 2
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
75. DEEDS AGAINST NATURE, AND MONSTERS BY KINDE: TRYED AT THE GOALE OF
DELIVERIE OF NEWGATE, AT THE SESSIONS IN THE OLD BAYLY, THE 18. AND 19. OFJULY LAST,
1614, THE SNE OF A LONDON CRIPPLE NAMED JOHN ARTHUR, THAT TO HIDE His SHAME AND
LUST, STRANGLED His BETROTHED WIFE. THE OTHER OF A LAscmous YOUNG DAMSELL
NAMED MARTHA SCAMBLER, WHICH MADE AWAY THE FRUIT OF HER OWN WOMB, THAT THE
WORLD MIGHT NOT SEE THE SEED OF HER OWNE SHAME: WHICH TWO PERSONS WITH
DIUERS OTHERS WERE EXECUTED AT TYBURNE THE 21. OF JULY FOLLOWING. WITH TWO
SORROWFUL DIMES OF THESE TWO AFORESAID PERSONS, MADE BY THEMSELVES IN
NEWGATE, THE NIGHT BEFORE THEIR EXECUTION (1614), available at httpJ/eebo.chadwyck
.com (follow "Search" link; then search Title Keyword(s) "deeds against nature"; then follow
first result).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. INGRAM, supra note 63, at 28.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 84-98.
82. F.G. EMMISON, ELIZABETHAN LIFE: MORALS & THE CHURCH COURTS 41 (1973).
Saven, also known as savin, was a drug made from the tops of the evergreen bush and was
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The charge was incest with her brother-in-law, and the mention
of savin seems incidental.83 Attempting abortion was not part of the
accusation.' Indeed, at the next session of the court, Margaret's hus-
band "sought the royal indulgence to be granted to her" - that is,
a general royal pardon - and she was discharged.85
Another case from 1627 suggests that the main concern was
something other than the abortion itself.8 When Joan Thorpe, a
servant, became pregnant:
[Finding her ordinary monthly courses ceased demanded of her
mistress.., what were good for her to take, and her mistress told
her; she thereupon received as was directed, and upon the taking
of the same being first a posset of hyssop, and another of worm-
wood and saffron, she grew very sick therewith and her courses
returned and brake out very powerfully upon her and so continued
until her delivery as aforesaid.87
She gave birth to a "very little" child, which she hid in a pile of waste,
and was presumably prosecuted under the 1624 infanticide statute,
rather than a law penalizing abortion.88
Numerous other cases, including many cited by Dellapenna,
emphasize this point.89 For example, in 1504, a king's coroner viewed
the body of Jane Wynspere of Basford:
[A] single woman, being pregnant .... being inspired by the devil
drank various bad and [impure] potions in order to kill and
destroy the child in her body, . . . as a result of which the said
Jane then and there died, and thus the same Jane in manner and
form aforesaid feloniously and as a felo de se slew and poisoned
herself and the child in her body....0
The report does not fail to note that the felon was a single woman,
suggesting the concerns of the case.9 The language in the report
both highly poisonous and commonly used to cause abortion. Id.; INGRAM, supra note 63,
at 159; JOHN M. RIDDLE, EVE'S HERBS: A HISTORY OF CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN
THE WEST 54-55 (1997).
83. See EMMISON, supra note 82, at 41 (describing the charges against Margaret
Manister).
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See AMUSSEN, supra note 51, at 114 (recounting the case of Joan Thorpe).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 114-15.
89. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 177-82 (discussing a number of cases concerning
abortions in the sixteenth century).
90. Id. at 177-78 (quoting R. v. Lichenfeld, (1505) 27 K.B 974).
91. Id.
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also is relevant in other ways. The word Dellapenna translates as
"pregnant,"puerpera, more commonly meant "woman who has been,
or is in process of being delivered, of a child."92 Thus, the facts as
recorded indicate a woman at least in a very advanced stage of preg-
nancy, if not in actual labor. This is clearly a case of fetal destruction
after quickening, at the very least. Moreover, the phrasing of the
charge - "as a felo de se slew and poisoned herself and the child in
her body"93 - makes clear that the charge is suicide ("felo de se") and
not homicide, and the killing of the child was ancillary to that felony.94
In another instance, a man named William Wodlake was indicted
for "various felonies, murders, and misdemeanors,"95 including the
rape of a fourteen year old girl, whom he subsequently forced to
drink an abortifacient "by reason of which drink the same Katherine
was afterwards delivered of that child dead: so that the same William
Wodlake feloniously killed and murdered the child with the drink in
manner and form aforesaid, against the peace of the lord king etc."96
This was not a voluntary self-induced abortion; as such, it does not
speak to the woman's right to induce an abortion herself. Another
important point about this case, however, is what we might call its
"totality of circumstances." Clearly, Wodlake's prosecution is for more
than forcing an abortifacient on his victim: it is also about his other
serious crimes of rape and murder, as well as various misdemeanors.
97
As discussed, assaults resulting in abortions, especially in the con-
text of greater social disruption, as this one is, comprised a different
category of analysis from intra-marital abortions performed in the
private sphere.9"
The fear of disorder aspect of law enforcement sheds light on
the fact, generally agreed upon by legal historians, that courts as
late as the early 1500s did not deem infanticide "as heinous as other
killings." 99 When infanticide did become the object of stricter enforce-
ment, harsh punishment, and public concern in general, °° it was in
92. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1515 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 1983). Dellapenna acknowledges
this alternate meaning in a footnote. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 177 n.427.
93. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 178 (quoting R. v. Lichenfeld, (1505) 27 K.B. 974).
94. Matthew Hale defined felo de se as "[t]hat which is committed against his own
Life." SIR MATrHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN: A METHODICAL SUMMARY 26 (P.R.
Glazebrook ed., 1972) (1678).
95. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 178-79 (quoting R. v. Wodlake, (1530) 9 K.B. 513).
96. Id. at 179.
97. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 178-79 (describing Wodlake's indictment for
rape and murder).
98. It is remotely conceivable that some of the assault cases were pretexts for vol-
untary abortions, but in that case it is hard to understand why the women would have
brought the case.
99. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 143.
100. See id. at 143 (noting the "increasingly draconian approach" taken toward
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the context of anxiety about illegitimacy and threats to the social
order. 101 As noted above, the laws targeting infanticide were generally
directed at unwed mothers who were suspected of murdering their
illegitimate children, not at married women.1 °2 This context should
enlighten the analysis of the legal history of abortion in this period,
and can help explain some of the legal landscape's seeming anomalies.
To conclude this section, I invoke a literary work which takes
anxiety about sexual energy unharnessed by family life as one of its
themes.° 3 Shakespeare's Measure for Measure'°4 is populated primar-
ily by what Natasha Korda calls "placeless single people" - especially
unmarried women.'05 The play, she argues, is "preoccupied" with the
problem of the displaced and vagrant and with the legal measures
that sought to control them.0 6 Each of the single women in the play
embodies a threat associated with female sexuality not safely cabined
in marriage: Juliet has slept with her betrothed before marriage and
is carrying a so-far illegitimate child;'0 7 Mistress Overdone works as
a "bawd";1 8 Mariana, while engaged to be married, remains free of a
husband's control;0 9 Isabella is about to enter a nunnery,110 a site, at
least before the Reformation, of female community not controlled by
men."' In this parade of transgressive or potentially transgressive
infanticide beginning in the Elizabethan era).
101. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 48, at 13 (noting that "growing concern for social
disorder" influenced the creation of the "Elizabethan social control laws," including a law
punishing the parents of illegitimate children (citing 1576, 18 Eliz. I, c. 3 (Eng.)).
102. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94.
103. Mario Digangi argues:
[T]hat the relentless definition and manipulation of female sexuality in
Measure for Measure is the graphic symptom of male anxiety about female
agency: to unravel male-constructed meanings for erotic pleasure, pregnancy,
and abortion is to discover a fear of the dangers thought to ensue from a
woman's control over her own body.
Mario Digangi, Pleasure and Danger: Measuring Female Sexuality in Measure for
Measure, 60 ELH 589, 590 (1993).
104. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE (S. Nagarajan ed., New Am.
Library 1998) (1623) [hereinafter MEASURE FOR MEASURE).
105. NATASHA KORDA, SHAKESPEARE'S DOMESTIC ECONOMIES: GENDER AND PROPERTY
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 160 (2002).
106. Id. at 161.
107. See MEASURE FOR MEASURE, supra note 104, at act 1, sc. 2, lines 149-98 (showing
Claudio being transported to prison for having "got possession of Julietta's bed").
108. Id., Dramatis Personae.
109. See id. at act 3, sc. 1, lines 211-78 (describing Mariana's situation after her fianc6
"[1]eft her in her tears").
110. See id. at act 1, sc. 4, lines 1-14 (describing Isabella's concerns about entering the
nunnery with Francisca, a nun).
111. In her article A Refuge from Men: The Idea of a Protestant Nunnery, Bridget Hill
notes the depiction of nunneries in a 1622 play:
In her play The Convent of Pleasure, Lady Happy ... cloisters herself in a
convent because she believes that marriage, even to "best of Men, if any best
120 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 14:107
female sexuality, there is no mention of abortion.112 The preoccupation
with premarital sex, exemplified by Juliet's paramour's death sen-
tence for the offense, indicates that the concern here is with overall
social disorder and ways to control it.113 As the Duke explains:
... Liberty plucks Justice by the nose;
The baby beats the nurse, and quite athwart
Goes all decorum.
114
The play's expressions of anxiety in its dramatic choices are
consistent with the concerns of the day. Abortion does not warrant
mention, and this absence is consistent with the fact that it is only as
an enabler of social disorder and poverty, the greater concerns the
play addresses, that it seems to have troubled the courts.
B. Medical Knowledge and Experience
Medical knowledge and the experience of the body in the early
modern era shed light on the issue of abortion in a number of ways.
First, some people had knowledge of abortifacient herbs and medi-
cines, and recipes for such drugs appeared in midwife manuals and
family papers.1 Second, pregnancy, especially in the first months,
was hard to detect, even for the woman involved, and menstruation
might stop for any number of reasons other than conception.116
Finally, theories of fetal development at the time, while allowing for
life in the womb from conception, did not recognize fetal life as fully
human before quickening."' For all these reasons, prescriptions for
"bringing down the courses," though commonly understood to induce
miscarriages, were not, except in rare instances that I will address,
there be[,"] would have "more crosses and sorrows than pleasure, freedom, or
happiness, nay Marriage to those that are Vertuous is a greater restrain than
a Monastery[."] Of women's many troubles men were the worst, and life in a
convent, she argues, "bars the life from nothing else but Men[."]
Bridget Hill, A Refuge from Men: The Idea of a Protestant Nunnery, PAST & PRESENT,
Nov. 1987, at 107, 112 (quoting MARGARET CAVENDISH, THE CONVENT OF PLEASURE (1668)).
112. See MEASURE FOR MEASURE, supra note 104.
113. See id. at act 1, sc. 2, lines 66-74 (describing Claudio's sentence, "within these three
days his head to be chopped off," for "getting Madam Julietta with child").
114. Id. at act 1, sc. 3, lines 29-31.
115. DOLAN, supra note 27, at 136-37.
116. See Patricia Crawford, Attitudes to Menstruation in Seventeenth-Century England,
91 PAST & PRESENT 47, 53-54 (1981) (noting that cessation of menstruation, known as
amenorrhoea, was treated as a disease and a variety of different cures were invented for it).
117. See Martin J. Buss, The Beginning of Human Life as an Ethical Problem, 47 J.
RELIGION 244,245 (1967) ("English common law located the beginning of the human soul
at 'quickening,' which occurs at about four months.").
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censored or condemned."' Early self-induced disruptions of pregnancy
did not register as fetal murder."9
Both abortion and contraception techniques had probably been
known in ancient Rome and throughout the Middle Ages. 2 ' Herbs
such as ergot of rye, pennyroyal, and savin were known abortifacients:
medical and midwifery books, as well as private family recipe books,
were full of recipes for them.' For example, the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury manual The Diseases of Women, by Trotula of Salerno, instructs,
"[i]f women have scanty menses and emit them with pain, take one
dram each of betonica, pennyroyal, centonica, and wormwood; let them
be cooked ... in wine or water .... and let it be drunk steaming
hot." '22 A manual from the second half of the fifteenth century gives
recipes for herbal suppositories and assures its readers that "though
per were a ded childe in here wombe it wold bringe it oute." '23
The Jerningham family's private recipe book contains a recipe
explicitly described as an abortifacient: a brew of sowbread and fabers
syrup of birthwort roots was labeled "a great secret" that "cause[d]
miscarriage" and "force [d] away the birth dead or alive as allso the
afterbirth."'24 Elizabeth Freke's personal book of medical recipes lists
the ingredients for a concoction that "will strengthen the body and
preserve conception iff itt be true; iff nott itt will bring itt away with
ease and saffty and has done many women good to my knowledge and
is a very good medycyne." '25 Savin and rue were probably effective in
causing late term abortions because they cause uterine contractions
that would expel the fetus.
126
In addition to the books containing abortifacient concoctions,
references to the use of such medicines appear in personal letters and
diaries of the day."' The tone of these allusions is coy more than
secretive: it resembles the way women referred to other private mat-
ters, such as menstruation or pregnancy itself. For example, a late
118. See generally RIDDLE, supra note 82, at 143-48 (discussing herbs commonly
recommended to "stimulate the menses" without mentioning the fetus "thereby expelled").
119. See infra Part III.A.
120. SHULAMITH SHAHAR, THE FOURTH ESTATE: A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE
AGES 123 (Chaya Galai trans., 1983).
121. DOLAN, supra note 27, at 136-37.
122. SALERNO, supra note 29, at 7.
123. THE'SEKENESSE OF WYMMEN': AMIDDLE ENGLISH TREATISE ON DISEASES IN WOMEN
37 (M.R. Hallaert ed., 1982).
124. Linda A. Pollock, Embarking on a Rough Passage: The Experience of Pregnancy
in Early-Modern Society, in WOMEN AS MOTHERS IN PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 39, 55
(Valerie Fildes ed., 1990).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 56.
127. See id. at 2, 56.
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seventeenth century letter from Margaret, Countess of Wemyss, to
her daughter Anna, Countess of Leven, stated, "I hear you have been
taking a little physick, I hope it will do you good. I should have been
sory if you had so soon fallen with child before you recover some more
strength." 121 Mary Fitton, who was pregnant and unmarried, received
a note from her mother warning her against using harsh physick be-
cause it might cause an abortion.12 Linda Pollock speculates that many
categories of miscarriage - those which threatened the mother's
life, those in women with closely spaced pregnancies, those late in
a woman's child-bearing years, and those late in the pregnancy -
may have been intentionally brought about by abortifacients.1
30
Indeed, so common was knowledge of abortifacient herbs, that
an audience would have understood Shakespeare's Ophelia to have
been pregnant and attempting, or contemplating, an induced miscar-
riage when she utters her puzzling ditty:
1 31
There's fennel for you, and columbines. There's rue for you,
and here's some for me .... You must wear your rue with a
difference.
132
This interpretation sheds new light on Ophelia's earlier lamentations
about treacherous lovers and maidens who lost their virginity.
33
She seems to be regretting a sexual encounter with Prince Hamlet,
who has famously broken off their engagement, and is now facing the
consequences of her trust.1 34 No sense of sin or transgression seems
to attach to her allusions to abortifacients: her sin, if sin there be,
arises from the possibility that she committed suicide.
131
There has been considerable speculation about the recipes for
abortifacients published in medical manuals. They call for the use
of herbs which were generally known, and acknowledged today, to pro-
voke miscarriages. 136 Yet very few of the texts include any warning
128. Id. at 56.
129. Id. at 66 n.112.
130. Id. at 57-58.
131. See RIDDLE, supra note 82, at 49 ("Shakespeare's contemporary audience would
understand [the reference to rue] better than today's readers ....).
132. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 4, sc. 5, lines 177-79
(Constance Jordan ed., Pearson Longman 2005) (1623).
133. Id. at act 4, sc. 5, lines 57-65.
134. The notion that Hamlet and Ophelia had a sexual encounter is first suggested by
her description of an incident in act 2, scene 1. Id. at act 2, sc. 1, lines 76-83. Hamlet ends
their engagement in act 3, scene 1. Id. at act 3, sc. 1, lines 133-38.
135. In act 5, scene 1, after Ophelia's death by drowning, her gravediggers discuss
whether she has committed suicide and thereby sinned. See id. at act 5, sc. 1, lines 1-52.
136. RIDDLE, supra note 82, at 145, 186-87.
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about the potential abortifacient effect of these concoctions, 37 merely
labeling them recipes to "bringeth down their Courses," 8 or "provoke 0
the terms." 139 Some have speculated that this reticence indicates a
kind of code, whereby the recipes could be passed on as harmless
medicines when everyone knew for what they were really used.
140
Others have insisted that there is no need to read an abortifacient
use into the recipes in an age when malnourishment and disease
made amenorrhea common. 141 1 offer a third way of reading these texts
with their lack of acknowledgment of their herbs' abortifacient
characteristics. I suggest that the difference between "bring[ing] down
their Courses"'4' and causing a miscarriage in the time before
quickening was seen as so minimal as not to warrant discussion.
Because of uncertainty about the woman's state, and because any
conception at an early stage was not seen as fully human, contempo-
raries may not have seen a significant difference between "provok-
ing the terms""'4 and causing a miscarriage.
My theory in this regard must of course account for the excep-
tions - the midwife and medical manuals which did warn against the
use of emmenagogues.14 Jane Sharp, the seventeenth century mid-
wife and author, is a rare example of this.145 The warning is buried in
a paragraph of instructions for bringing on menstruation, which reads
as follows:
Ointments and Plaisters are good also, and pessaries made of
Aromatical things, and sweet smells, and Fumes; as take Benzoin,
Storax Calamita, Bdellium, Myrrh, what you please; mingle them,
and strew some on a pan of Coles; the woman so placed, that she
may receive the Fume by a Tunnel, broad at the lower end, to keep
the smoke in: but lest these Fumes cause the head-ach, keep the
Fumes down with clothes about the woman, that they come not
to her head: But do none of these things to women with child, for
that will be Murder: give your remedy a little before the Full Moon,
or between the New and the full, for then blood increaseth: but
never in the Wane of the Moon, for it doth no good: Sometimes,
but seldome the courses stop with Fulness; such must, saith
Riolanus, be let blood in the arm, but with great care.1
46
137. Id. at 145-47, 186-87.
138. Id. at 187.
139. Id. at 186.
140. Id. at 189.
141. See id. at 26.
142. Id. at 187.
143. Id. at 186.
144. See, e.g., JANE SHARP, THE MIDWIVES BOOK: OR THE WHOLE ART OF MIDWIFRY
DISCOVERED 220-21 (Elaine Hobby ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1671).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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A number of aspects of this passage are interesting. First, the
admonition about "murder" 147 is tossed into the middle of the para-
graph like an afterthought; it is surrounded by instructions for doing
just what it warns against. 148 Second, there would be no way of know-
ing with any certainty whether a woman were "with child" 149 or not
unless she was past quickening. 5 ° Thus, it is hard to see what pur-
pose the warning serves. A reference to the book as a whole, however,
may explain this anomaly. First, it was one of the few manuals
written by women,' 5 ' and it seems plausible that the author may
have added this sentence as a way of establishing credibility with the
Church authorities who were in charge of her licensing.'52 Midwives
were licensed by the Church of England through the early 1720s and
as late as the end of the eighteenth century outside of London.'53
Historians have speculated that the interest of the Church in having
control of midwifery had to do with the importance of baptism and the
midwife's role in baptizing the newly born.14 But, others challenge
this assertion, claiming that post-Reformation theology was less ada-
mant on the damnation of the soul of an unbaptized infant, and
noting the corresponding decline of the role of the midwife in admin-
istering baptism in the post-Reformation years.'55 Whatever the case,
Sharp was entering a man's field - not by practicing midwifery but
by writing about it. 5 ' Second, by this date, male practitioners were
entering the field of midwifery and discrediting female midwives. 117
In this respect, also, Sharp may have felt the need to toe the Church
line to maximize her credibility. 5 '
With respect to women's experience of pregnancy, the logic of
quickening as a transitional moment between indeterminacy and
human status makes sense. First, it was extremely hard for anyone,
including the woman, to tell in the first few months if a woman was
147. Id. at 221.
148. Id. at 220-21.
149. Id. at 221.
150. See JACKSON, supra note 32, at 61.
151. Elaine Hobby, Introduction to JANE SHARP, supra note 144, at xi, xvi.
152. Id. at xi, xiv.
153. DOREEN EVENDEN, THE MIDWIVES OF SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY LONDON 24, 26
(2000).
154. Id. at 26.
155. Id.
156. Hobby, supra note 151, at xvi.
157. Id. at xii.
158. Id. Male practitioners did not try to discredit female midwives by accusing them
of performing abortions, as Reva Siegal has shown was the case in the early United
States, but did try to do so by claiming they were incompetent, ignorant, and dangerous
to maternal health and safety.
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pregnant.159 Due to lack of nutrition and inadequate diets, preg-
nancy did not cause the weight gain it is associated with causing in
the developed modern world."6 Moreover, contemporary clothes were
bulkier and looser, making any weight gain and change in body shape
less obvious. 6' Medical textbooks and midwives' manuals abound
with methods to detect pregnancy.6 2 One method considered sure,
and resorted to when a single woman was suspected of pregnancy,
was for a neighbor woman to demand to inspect her breasts.'63 If
squeezing them produced milk, the woman was deemed to be or have
recently been pregnant." Single women, servants, and those with-
out families were much more vulnerable to such inspections; married
women's pregnancies aroused little concern, and widows in possession
of property and social status were more able to refuse these bodily
invasions.6 5
Because of this indeterminacy, the concept of quickening as the
beginning of personhood makes sense: it is a logical point at which
the fetus becomes likely to become part of the human community.
Dellapenna, however, challenges the received wisdom about the
word "quickening" and its legal meaning.'66 First, he asserts that
"the doctrine of quickening [as a prerequisite for criminality of fetal
destruction] had not yet taken hold in the courts [in the thirteenth
century]." "17 He claims that the word could have meant "alive," based
on its derivation from the Latin concept of animation, or animatus.68
This may very well be true. The point is, however, that biological life
and human personhood were not the same.
Midwives' manuals make this distinction clearly.'69 Because a
woman showing early signs of pregnancy could not be sure of what
was really going on, the manuals offer many warnings about other
sources of the symptoms. 7 ° Sometimes, for example, nature could
159. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 62.
160. See Pollock, supra note 124, at 43 (discussing numerous common symptoms of
pregnancy without mention of weight gain).
161. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 63.
162. See id. at 60-65 (listing and discussing morning sickness, difficulty urinating,
hemorrhoids, lack of menstruation, increase in stomach and breast size, movement of the
fetus, internal examination, weight gain, and periods of illness as evidence corroborating
suspicious of pregnancy).
163. Id. at 72-73.
164. Id.
165. See SHAHAR, supra note 120, at 95 ("[A] widow who was well provided for enjoyed
greater freedom than any other type of woman in medieval society.").
166. See DELLAPENA, supra note 3, at 139.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. See SHARP, supra note 144, at 86.
170. See id. at 85-90.
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"work H in vain" 171 and produce mere growths in the womb, "ill shaped
lump [s] of flesh," despite the fact that "their bellies were swoln so
great, and their courses were staid and came not down according to
natures custome." 172 One variety of these included the so-called "false
Moles," swellings in the womb created by excess of wind, blood,
humors, or water.' 73 A mole was "a mishapen piece of flesh without
figure or order, it is full of Veins and Vessels with discoloured veins
or membranes of almost all colours, without any entrails or bones, or
motion." 1 7 4 Even if a child were conceived along with the Mole, this is
no good, because the Mole "draws the nourishment from the Child." 175
While these failed conceptions can be alive and "have some sense or
feeling or true motion," they might also be dead lumps of flesh.' 76 In
addition, "[m]onsters of all sorts [can] be formed in the womb."' 77
These are "error[s] of nature failing of the end she works for, by some
corrupted principle." 78 Perhaps, some midwives speculated, they are
a form of divine vengeance. 79 As these passages make clear, all sorts
of things in the womb could be alive; organic living matter was not
the feature that made them human.
Because of such monstrous deviations, "[i]t is very hard to know
a false conception from a true until four moneths be past," and thus
the concept of quickening: after four months, "the motion of the body
of the thing conceived will shew it; for if it be a living Child, that
moves quick and lively; but the false conception falls from one side
to another like a stone."' 0 Motion was the key to determining if the
conception was a human: "[t]he Child that is alive moves to all sides,
and upward and downward without any help ... [whereas] [a] false
conception may have a motion from the expulsive faculty, but not
from it self ... [but] ... tumbles to one side or other."' 8
This lack of personhood of the pre-quickened fetus goes back to
Anglo-Saxon medical texts, one of which tells us "[o]n tham thriddum
monthe he bith'man butan sawle [In the third month he is a man
without a soul]." "82 Even this early, the distinction between something
171. Id. at 85.
172. Id. at 84.
173. Id. at 85.
174. Id. at 84.
175. Id. at 85.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 87.
178. Id. at 89.
179. Id. at 117.
180. Id. at 86.
181. SHARP, supra note 144, at 88.
182. M.S. Corr. TIBERIUS, in 3 LEECHDOMS, WORTCUNNING, AND STARCRAFT OF EARLY
ENGLAND 146, 146-47 (Oswald Cockayne ed.), in 35 CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS OF
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that is alive and something that has a soul, and is therefore human,
is apparent. The Midwives Book sets this development out as follows:
"a Man lives successively, first the life of a Plant, then of a Beast, and
lastly of a Man. For first the Child grows, then it begins to move, last
of all it becomes a reasonable Soul." 183 These lines make clear that
there was no lack of understanding of the fetus as technically alive
from an early stage - as indeed was the false conception, the Mole -
but even being technically alive did not make it a human,1' 4 or even
endowed with reason or a soul. This was not the salient point, how-
ever: it was not until it moved, or quickened, that it became endowed
with the qualities which make it partake of full human reason and
spirit. 185
Finally, the midwife manual quoted earlier in respect to the
definitions of abortion shows clearly that the fetus only gradually
approached biological, and then human, status. 6 The first line -
"[w]hen a Woman casts forth in the Beginning what she had retained
by Conception in the Womb, 'tis called an Effluxion, or a sliding away
of the Seeds, because they have not yet acquir'd any solid Sub-
stance"' 7 - makes short shrift of the idea that human life begins
at conception. Only at a later stage is "the Infant... already formed,
and begins to live" - and this "stage" seems fairly near the end of
the pregnancy, because this is when, the author warns, it may "come f
before the time ordain'd and prescrib'd by Nature." '88
This indeterminacy of fetal status may underlie some of the legal
thinking about fetal death. For example, Britton denied that a woman
could bring an appeal for fetal death, because an appeal on behalf of
someone who could not be named was invalid.'89 The author of The
Mirror of Justices argued that a fetus in its mother's womb could not
be the victim of homicide because no one could be sure until birth that
it would turn out to be a human and not a monster. 9 ° Schneebeck
GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES (Kraus Reprint 1965) (1857).
183. SHARP, supra note 144, at 105.
184. Id. at 84-85, 105.
185. Id. at 105.
186. MAURICEAU, supra note 38, at 110.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. BRITTON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES 95-96 (Francis Morgan Nichols
trans., John Byrne & Co. 1901).
190. SELDEN Soc'Y, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES 139 (William Joseph Whittaker ed.,
Bernard Quaritch 1895). This is not to quarrel with the general agreement that this is
a highly unreliable text; my interest in it is the discourse, not the law itself. Frederic
William Maitland, Introduction to SELDEN SOC'Y, THE MIRROR OF JUSTICES, at ix, x
(William Joseph Whittaker ed., Bernard Quaritch 1895).
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calls this reasoning "curious," 191 but, seen in context, it makes sense.
First, medical techniques and prenatal care of the day was such that
many things could go wrong in fetal formation, and there were many
forms of false pregnancy. 9 2 But these views also stem from the fact
discussed above, that a fetus before a certain point was not deemed
fully human: it did not have a soul, it did not have reason.'93 These
challenges to causes of action for fetal death must be seen in this
light. This thinking also comports with the notion that a woman's
appeal for fetal death was based on injury to her body, not on injury
to the fetus as a legal person."'
Another aspect of the contemporary discourse of the body impor-
tant, I believe, to this discussion, is the belief in purging as beneficial
to both sexes.'95 This culture saw sickness as an imbalance in the
body's humoral system and sought to remedy it by expelling the ex-
cessive element.196 The author of the Sekenesse of Wymmen, quoted
above, explains that women use suppositories for purging to bring
on menstruation just as "men put suppositoryes yn a mans fundament
[rectum] to purge hys wombe." '97 Underlying purging's popularity was
the fact that people in the sixteenth century viewed, and experienced,
their bodies differently from the way we do, in general, today. They
felt their bodies to be more porous, more susceptible to germs and
external influences of all kinds.'98 Moreover, humoral theory made
purging appealing: a body suffering from too much heat could open
a vein in the arm and get relief, blood being considered a source of hot
humors." Menstruation was seen as a kind of purging of nourishment
that was not needed if the woman was pregnant."' In fact, women's
bodies were thought particularly 'leaky" and unstable.20 ' The neces-
sity of purging in the medical context suggests, I argue, a parallel
acceptance of the purging of fetal matter.
191. Harold N. Schneebeck, Jr., The Law of Felony in Medieval England From the
Accession of Edward I Until the Mid-Fourteenth Century 233 (Dec. 1973) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (on file with Law Library, Indiana University).
192. See SHARP, supra note 144, at 84-87.
193. EDWARDO COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND:
CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 50
(William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1797).
194. THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS 69 (F.L. Attenborough ed., trans.,
Russell & Russell 1963) (1922).
195. GAIL KERN PASTER, THE BODY EMBARRASSED: DRAMA AND THE DISCIPLINES OF
SHAME IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 73 (1993).
196. Hobby, supra note 151, at xxiv.
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200. Id. at 80.
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III. LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Laws
The earliest legal texts in England are those of the Anglo-Saxon
King Aethelbert and date from about 600 A.D.,2"2 followed by those
of Ine, from the early ninth century, and then those of Alfred the
Great, written in the late ninth century.2 3 I digress from the early
modern focus of this article to examine them because they are the
predecessors of the early modern English law of trespass and reveal
the basis for treating an injury to a pregnant woman's fetus as an
injury to the woman, not as murder of the fetus.20 4 Alfred's laws are
the first to contain any kind of fetal destruction provision. Chapter
Nine states the following:
If anyone slays a woman with child, while the child is in her
womb, he shall pay the full wergeld for the woman, and half the
wergeld for the child, [which shall be] in accordance with the
wergeld of the father's kindred.0 5
The surrounding context makes clear that the wergeld penalty
reflects a loss of a material possession of the husband involved.20 6 In
fact, the subparagraphs of this section contain stipulations regular-
izing the amount of the fines for stealing other material goods, such
as "gold and horses and bees." 207 Attenborough calls this shift from
human to chattel a "complete change of subject,""20 but this is not nec-
essarily accurate. Rather, as the context makes clear, these sections
deal with compensation for material losses.209 For example, the pre-
vious paragraph, number eight, establishes the wergeld owed by a
man who "takes a nun from a nunnery without the permission of the
king or bishop," namely, "120 shillings, half to the king, and half to
the bishop and the lord of the church, under whose charge the nun
is." 211 Clearly, the two sections are analogous: both address compen-
sation for loss when a lord of some kind loses a female underling's
services, procreative or otherwise.211 In this context, the half wergeld
202. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 2 (3d ed. 1990).
203. THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS, supra note 194, at 34.
204. See id. at 69.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 195.
209. Id. at 69.
210. Id.
211. See id.
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to be paid for the child would most likely represent the lost possibility
of an heir.212 In this light, recompense for loss of gold, horses, and bees
may not be such a non sequitur as Attenborough supposes.
The next significant set of written laws is that of Henry I (Leges
Henrici Primi) dating from the early twelfth century,213 when the
common law began to emerge as a somewhat cohesive body through
the aggressive administration and centralization of the Norman con-
querors.214 The Leges are probably based on a combination of some
Anglo-Saxon law and patristic and other Church-related texts, conti-
nental German codes, and the law of Anglo-Saxon kings, most exten-
sively those of King Canute.215 Most importantly for my purposes is
that their author was most likely a continental observer who gathered
assorted pieces of several parallel legal regimes, mostly Anglo-Saxon
and canon law, to which he added various of his personal observa-
tions.1 6 Here appear the Anglo-Saxon wergeld tradition and new,
canon law provisions which show some concern for harm to the fetus,
side by side. These laws make the following provisions for abortion:
Si pregnans occidatur et puer in ea uiuat, uterque plena
wera reddatur. (If a pregnant woman is slain, and the child in
her is living, each shall be compensated for by the full wergeld.)
Si nondum uiuus sit, dimidia wera soluatur parentibus ex
parte patris. (If the child is not yet living, half the wergeld shall be
paid to the relatives, based on the paternal relationship.) ....
Mulieres que fornicantur et partus suos extingunt et eas
que secum agunt ut utero conceptum excutiant, antiqua difflnitio
usque ad exitum uite remouet ab ecclesia. (Women who commit
fornication and destroy their embryos, and those who are acces-
sories with them, so that they abort the foetus from the womb,
are by an ancient ordinance excommunicated from the church
until death.)
Nunc clementius diffinitum: x annis penitea[n] t. (A milder
provision has now been introduced: they shall do penance for ten
years.)
Mulier si partum suum ante xl dies sponte perdiderit tribus
annis peniteat, si postquam animatus est, quasi homicida vii
annis peniteat. (A woman shall do penance for three years if she
intentionally brings about the loss of her embryo before forty
days; if she does this after it is quick, she shall do penance for
seven years as if she were a murderess.)217
212. See id.
213. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 1 (L.J. Downer ed., trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1972).
214. BAKER, supra note 202, at 14.
215. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 213, at 4, 28.
216. BAKER, supra note 202, at 15.
217. LEGEs HENRICI PRIMi, supra note 213, at 222-23.
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The first two provisions reflect the wergeld tradition of the laws of
Alfred. 218 As noted above, this does not mean that the fetus was con-
sidered a person.219 Wergeld was paid and carefully calculated not only
for each person according to his or her social status, but also for indi-
vidual body parts down to toes and fingernails, as well as for chattel.220
These first two paragraphs, then, are drawn from Anglo-Saxon law.221
The last three have a distinctly different tone and reflect the author's
interpolation of his canon law sources.2' The punishments he enumer-
ates support this reading: suddenly, we are in the realm of penance
rather than wergeld, the cleansing of the soul rather than the paying
of compensation.223 Clearly, these provisions are not part of the Anglo-
Saxon common law. Two parallel legal regimes regarding fetal de-
struction, then, appear at this early stage: one requires compensation
to the woman or her kin, while the other looks to the cleansing of the
sinner's soul.
224
Also significant in the Leges is the fact that the second group of
provisions applies to "[w] omen who commit fornication." 225 This head-
ing implies that this part is concerned exclusively with women who
destroy embryos caused by illicit sex.226 This set of laws, then, suggests
a greater concern with sexual transgression and its consequences,
a concern that reflects the intrusion of canon law and its preoccupation
with sexual morality.227 Tellingly, the Leges contains no parallel pro-
vision for married women.22" As I will show, this was the first sign of
what would become the overriding concern about abortion, a concern
that it would allow illicit sex to go undetected and unpunished.221 From
the beginning, concerns about abortion were a part of the broader
concern with illicit sex and its consequences: the "fornication" clause
218. See THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS, supra note 194, at 69; LEGES
HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 213, at 222-23.
219. See THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS, supra note 194, at 69; LEGES
HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 213, at 222-23.
220. LEGES HENRICI PRIMI, supra note 213, at 296-97.
221. See id. at 222-23.
222. Id.
223. See id. (comparing "[i]f a pregnant woman is slain, and the child in her is living,
each shall be compensated for by the full wergeld" with "[w]omen who commit fornication
and destroy their embryos, and those who are accessories with them, so that they abort
the foetus from the womb, are by an ancient ordinance excommunicated from the church
until death").
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. My thanks to Art Lefrancois for raising this issue.
229. See HOFFER & HuLL, supra note 48, at 154-55 (describing the use of abortion to
conceal extramarital pregnancy).
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seems to ignore the destruction of embryos within marriage, that is,
within the boundaries of accepted sexual conduct.
2 31
As discussed below, this overriding worry drove the courts over
the next several centuries. 231 For example, to detour briefly from the
chronological review of statutes, the infanticide statute of 1624.reflects
this same concern with illicit sex and the crimes arising from it.
232
The following Acte created a presumption that an unmarried
woman found with a dead infant would be presumed to have mur-
dered it unless another witness testified that it was born alive.233
The law reads:
An Acte to p'vent the murthering of Bastard Children:
WHEREAS many lewd Women that have been delivered of
Bastard Children, to avoyd their shame and to escape Punishment,
doe secretlie bury, or conceale the Death, of their Children, &
after if the Child be found dead the said Women do alleadge that
the said Childe was borne dead; whereas it falleth out sometymes
(although hardlie it is to be proved) that the said Child or Children
were murthered by the said Women their lewd Mothers, or by
their assent or pcurement: For the p'venting therefore of this great
Mischeife, be it enacted by the Authoritie of this p'sent Parliament,
That if any Woman after one Moneth next ensuing the end of
this Session of Parliament, be delivered of any Issue of her Body
Male or Female, which being born alive, should by the Lawes of
this Realme be a Bastard, and that she endeavor privatelie either
by drowning or by secrett burying thereof... soe to conceale the
Death thereof, as that it may not come to light, whether it were
borne alive or not... the Mother soe offending shall suffer Death
as in case of murther, except such Mother can make pffe by one
Witnesse at the least, that the Child... was borne dead.234
The statute targets 'lewd women" and "bastard children"; like the
Leges, it ignores the murder of children born within marriage. 235 The
case records bear out this reading: the typical offender under this
statute was a young, unmarried woman accused of murdering her
newborn infant.236 The statute's aim seems to have been to stem the
economic, more than the moral, cost of non-marital sex. 237 This
230. See id.
231. See infra text accompanying notes 232-37, 343-51, 369-74.
232. See Acte to P'vent the Murthering of Bastard Children 1623-24,21 Jac., c. 27 (Eng.).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 48, at 22.
236. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 144; HOFFER & HULL, supra note 48, at 95.
237. JACKSON, supra note 32, at 30; see also SANDRA CLARK, WOMEN AND CRIME IN THE
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enduring worry, I suggest, is the common theme in the Leges and the
1624 statute.
To continue chronologically: Bracton, at the beginning of the
thirteenth century, declared that abortion after animation was homi-
cide: "[i]f... some one,... has struck a pregnant woman, or has given
her poison, whereby he has caused abortion, if the foetus be already
formed and animated, and particularly if it be animated, he commits
homicide." 2 3' This is the first appearance of the term "homicide" in
legal writing about abortion, and it probably reflects the canon law
influence.2 39 By the same token, however, it also reiterates the Church
doctrine that aborting a fetus pre-animation was not murder.2 41 Simi-
larly, at the end of the century, Fleta wrote "[a] woman ... commits
homicide if, by a potion or the like, she destroys a quickened child
in her womb. 241
Other treatises seem to contradict this rule, asserting that
homicide can only occur if the infant is killed after it is in rerum
natura, that is, born alive.242 In 1557, William Staunford summa-
rized the English law requirements for homicide by stating that "the
thing killed must be in part of the world of physical beings (in rerum
natura).'243 Therefore, he continues, "if one kills an infant in its
mother's womb, this is not a felony."244 Later, Coke famously said
that:
If a woman be quick with childe, and by a potion or otherwise
killeth it in her wombe; or if a man beat her, whereby the childe
dieth in her body, and she is delivered of a dead childe, this is a
great misprision, and no murder: but if the childe be born alive,
and dieth of the potion, battery, or other cause, this is murder:
for in law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum natura,
when it is born alive.245
STREET LITERATURE OF EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 44 (2003) (describing the 1624 statute
as a measure to "control the rate of illegitimate births, which was perceived by contem-
poraries to be a considerable problem of social order").
238. HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUSANGLIAE 279 (Sir Travers
Twiss ed., Longman & Co. 1880) (1569).
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. SELDEN Soc'Y, FLETA 61 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds., trans., Bernard
Quaritch 1955) (1647) [hereinafter FLETA].
242. See SIR WILLIAM STAUNFORD, LES PLEEs DEL CORON 21 (P.R. Glazenbrook ed.,
Profl Books Ltd. 1971) (1557).
243. Id. The translation is my own.
244. Id. The translation is my own.
245. COKE, supra note 193, at 50.
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Authorities agree that the word "misprision" means something
similar to "misdemeanor." 2 46 Blackstone, in 1765, concurred, noting
that "[]ife... began in contemplation of law as soon as an infant was
able to stir in the mother's womb," 247 and goes on to agree that, even
then, abortion is less than homicide,
[F]or if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise,
killeth in her womb, or if any one beat her whereby the child dieth
in her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter.248
Sir Matthew Hale wrote in the seventeenth century:
What the person killed?
It must be a person in rerum natura.
If a Woman quick with Child take a potion to kill it, and
accordingly it is destroyed without being born alive, a great mis-
prision, but no Felony; but if born alive, and after dies of that
potion, it is Murder.
The like if it dies of a stroke given by another in like
manner.
249
Legal texts appear to agree, at the least, that destruction of the fetus
pre-quickening is not homicide, but they differ as to when homicide
does attach. Some say after animation; others insist it is only after
the infant is born alive.25" Early modern notions of the nature of man
and reason may offer a way to reconcile these differences. Dellapenna
tries to avoid Coke's "born alive" statement by interpreting the phrase
in rerum natura to mean "that the law was not able to reach a defi-
nite conclusion" about the status of the fetus, which modern science
can do today."' In other words, he translates de rerum to mean biolog-
ically alive, part of the world of living things, a state modern science
can detect much earlier in gestation today. This interpretation of the
phrase in rerum natura is widespread. 2 This argument, however,
misunderstands Coke's text, its antecedents, and the culture. As Coke
himself says elsewhere, defining murder:
246. DICKENS, supra note 44, at 21.
247. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 238 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES
"129-30).
248. Id. at 238-39.
249. HALE, supra note 94, at 53.
250. Compare DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 238 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES *129-30), with HALE, supra note 94, at 53.
251. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 199-200.
252. See, e.g., Mark S. Scott, Quickening in the Common Law: The Legal Precedent Roe
Attempted and Failed to Use, 1 MICH. L. & POLY REv. 199 (1996).
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Murder is when a man of sound memory, and of the age of
discretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any
reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king's peace, with
malice fore-thought, either expressed by the party, or implied by
law, so as the party wounded, or hurt, &c. die of the wound, or
hurt, &c. within a year and a day after the same.253
To understand the meaning of the phrase, it is necessary to examine
it as a whole: "any reasonable creature in rerum natura under the
king's peace." 254 All of these qualities - having a soul, being part of
the natural world, being part of the "king's peace" - were necessary
attributes of the victim of homicide. Indeed, killing an outlaw - i.e.,
someone who had been removed from the king's peace - lacked a
requisite element and thus was not homicide.255 By the same token,
being a "reasonable" creature - that is, having a soul and being ca-
pable of reason - was an important part of being a legally cognizable
human being.256 Thus, there is reason to think that in rerum natura
means more than simply alive and reflects more than an evidentiary
deficit of the day.257
Sir Matthew Hale's commentary on this matter supports this
conclusion. In the section on murder in his Summary of the Pleas
of the Crown, Hale defines a "person killed" as "a person in rerum
natura."258 Immediately after this, he illustrates this definition by
giving an example of a non-homicidal killing: "[i]f a Woman quick with
Child take a potion to kill it, and accordingly it is destroyed without
being born alive," it is not murder.259 It becomes murder only when
the child is born - that is, exists in the world.2"
Early modern philosophy about man and the universe illuminate
this phrase's meaning. Reason was central to this age's concept of
humanity: it was the capacity for reason that distinguished man from
all the other so-called "faculties" of the universe and was the bond that
man shared with the divine.261 Man was the "nodal point" at the cen-
ter of creation; according to Augustine, "Ih]omo est utriusque naturae
vinculum": man is the link connecting the various forms of nature.262
253. COKE, supra note 193, at 47.
254. Id.
255. See generally DURSTON, supra note 18, at 152-53 (discussing the omission of enemy
aliens and thieves from homicide).
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His reason, and the related idea that man partook of the divine spirit
by having a soul, was central to what man was and what separated
him from animals." 3 In modern terms, this capacity was a require-
ment for legal personhood.
The idea, then, that a fetus only became ensouled after a certain
point in gestation has important implications for how its "person-
hood," or humanity, was viewed. The philosophy of the age suggests
that a fetus would not have legal personhood before at least quick-
ening, or the forty-day point at which this was thought to occur.
264
Contemporaries may have understood an embryo to be alive in some
biological sense but not endowed with fully human status. Thus,
whether the infant is endowed with reason at animation or at birth,
the underlying point is that neither the canon law nor the common
law granted it full personhood at the time of conception. Both legal
regimes - the one that requires animation for homicide and the one
that requires living birth - share this theme: mere conception of
the embryo is not enough.
B. The Structure of the Early Common Law Legal System
The fundamental structure of the common law in medieval and
early modern England was not amenable to the detection or prose-
cution of self-induced, early term abortion as a means of birth control
in marriage. First, the common law evolved not as a system of abstract
rules but as a system of writs, meaning that a legal remedy came into
being as a response to an injury done to someone, not from the vio-
lation of an abstract moral precept.265 Second, the early common law
was largely the province of men,266 while the world of pregnancy and
childbearing was the province of women.26 This has a number of
implications. It presents another structural feature - this time, a
gendered one - of the common law which made it unlikely to recog-
nize certain kinds of abortion, and its relegation of these matters to
the private, female sphere has implications for our understanding of
the history of privacy in our collective conscience.
First, with respect to writs, adjudicating a case did not involve
applying a rule of law to a set of facts so much as judging whether
the claim was acceptable within the existing system of writs, and
263. Id. at 71.
264. DICKENS, supra note 44, at 15; SHAHAR, supra note 120, at 124.
265. See NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTALAUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW 1-2
(1990).
266. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 46.
267. Hobby, supra note 151, at xvi.
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whether the writ presented did indeed offer a remedy for the wrong
at issue.268 Legislation of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries began
to develop a substantive set of rules which mandated certain results
upon a given set of facts.269 The origins of the common law, however,
lie not in statements of objective wrongdoing; they lie instead in the
formulation of claims one individual could make against another for
personal injury.2 70 This feature is apparent as early as the laws of
Alfred the Great, which itemize personal injuries and their requisite
compensation.2 71 Indeed, legal thinkers of the late medieval period,
beginning in the fifteenth century, saw the law as the codification
of human custom rather than an expression of any divine or natural
system existing outside of the human community. 272 This kind of
thinking is consistent with the origins of the common law in commu-
nity practice and as a system for addressing personal wrongs.
2 73
Along these lines, the notion of a "crime" grew out of the category
of offenses against a person or his chattel. 4 Such offenses, committed
with a certain degree of violence, became a breach of the king's peace,
which every male from the age of twelve had sworn to uphold.275
Under the Angevin rulers, there was further classification: Glanville
uses the terms "civil" and "criminal," but it is misleading to think their
meanings mirrored modern usage.2 76 Like modern criminal laws,
Glanville's criminal pleas were crimes that threatened the king's
peace and received state-sponsored punishment.2 77 Crimes were di-
vided into crown pleas and felonies: crown pleas were matters which
touched the royal interests closely, such as treason, breach of peace,
homicide, arson, robbery, and rape.2 78 The term felony referred to a
serious wrong, inherently involving a breach of the oath to the king,
but it could be prosecuted by appeal.2 79 By definition, crime was some-
thing that happened in the public sphere: it injured one of the king's
subjects and it disrupted the king's peace.2" Intra-marital, self-induced
abortion did not fit this paradigm.
268. DOE, supra note 265, at 1-2.
269. Id. at 2.
270. Id.
271. E.g., THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS, supra note 194, at 68-71.
272. DOE, supra note 265, at 4, 32. Doe finds what he calls a "persistent dialogue
between law and morality at work in both theory and practice" in late medieval law. Id. at
6. My point is merely that the writ system itself did not involve ideas of abstract morality.
273. DOE, supra note 265, at 4, 32.
274. JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OFTHE ENGLISH COMMON LAW: LAW AND SOCIETY
IN ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA 56 (1996).
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276. Id. at 160-62.
277. Id. at 160.
278. Id. at 161.
279. Id. at 162.
280. Id. at 165.
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By the same token, the process of formal trial came about most
often through the actions of the victims or their relatives, not by the
actions of the state.2"' One such process was called appeal and began
with an appointed day on which both parties were to appear, with
the accuser to make his charge and the defendant to make a formal
denial.28 2 As I will show later, the record contains cases brought by
women for assaults that killed fetuses they were carrying.2"3 First,
it is important to discuss the appeal procedure in some detail. John
Baker traces the appeal procedure to the blood feud, calling it "a legal
way of seeking revenge and emends." 2 These procedures were not
criminal in the sense that a state authority brought the charges, but
rather in the sense that they sought to punish serious crime, and, orig-
inally at least, to garner compensation for the victims.28 ' Their most
obvious modern analog is the tort.
The prosecution of an appeal began when the victim raised a "hue
and cry," requested help to capture the wrongdoer and seek recourse,
then showed his wounds - in the case of assault - to the local coro-
ner or hundred sergeant, who made a record of the wounds and took
names of the members of the tithing.286 Eventually, "the coroner en-
rolled the appeals verbatim" before the county court.28 7 The initiat-
ing procedure was followed by a long process of accusation and denial
involving investigation into the accused's reputation, and for hard
cases which could not be settled by other means, battle, oath, or ordeal
decided the case.288 Accusations could also be made by a local group -
the tithe or hundred - or by a royal official.289
Women could bring appeals in a limited number of cases, limited
to the death of a husband or possibly rape.2" Bracton likewise limited
women's appeals to cases "de morte viri sui interfecti inter brachia, et
non alio modo," 291 and Britton and Fleta agreed.292 The reason for the
husband's homicide exception to the general prohibition of women's
appeals was simple: since husband and wife were one flesh, the death
281. Id. at 70.
282. Id. at 71.
283. See cases cited infra note 301.
284. BAKER, supra note 202, at 574.
285. Id.
286. HUDSON, supra note 274, at 167-68.
287. Id. at 168.
288. Id. at 72.
289. Id. at 71.
290. Id. at 235.
291. HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 419 (George E.
Woodbine ed., Yale Univ. Press 1922) (1569).
292. BRITrON, supra note 189, at 95; FLETA, supra note 241, at 88.
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of a woman's husband was literal injury to her body as well.29 3 In
practice, however, it appears that justices allowed women to bring
appeals in other cases as well: although occasionally a county court
was fined for outlawing men appealed by women for killing their
relatives,"' county courts were generally not amerced for outlawing
men based on appeals by women for the deaths of their sons, brothers,
fathers, or daughters.295
The reason for the inflexibility of certain courts may have re-
flected the same logic underlying Magna Carta's limitations: under
coverture, a woman had no separate legal existence and could bring
an action for the death of her husband only because his death was
injury to her body, which was one with his.296 An unmarried woman
might, without coverture, be deemed to have greater scope for ap-
peals, although Magna Carta did not address this. Even if an appeal
were quashed on procedural grounds, however, the suit could be
taken over and prosecuted by the king.297 Fleta, however, stated that
a woman could also bring appeals for rape and the death of a child
in her womb.29
Dellapenna relies heavily on cases in which women brought
appeals for assaults causing the deaths of fetuses in their wombs.299
Indeed, most of the cases he cites as evidence for the condemnation
of abortion fall into this category. °° Misunderstanding the law,
293. See Hobby, supra note 151, at xi.
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297. See Schneebeck, supra note 191, at 228.
298. See FLETA, supra note 241, at 60-61, 88.
299. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 134-39.
300. Id.; see, e.g., Rechich's Case, in SOMERSETSHIRE PLEAS (CIVIL AND CRIMINAL) 321
(Charles E. H. Chadwyck Healey ed., 1887) (describing a 1243 third party assault that
caused miscarriage); Indictment of John Carter, in CALENDAR OFASSIZE RECORDS, KENT
INDICTMENTS 1649-1659, at 96 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1989) (describing a 1652 assault by
husband resulting in death, no abortion or child mentioned); Indictment of Richard
Poope, in Calendar of Assize Records, Kent Indictments Elizabeth 1, at 289 (J.S. Cockburn
ed., 1979) (describing a 1589 assault by third party); Indictment of Thomas Adkyns, in
CALENDAR OF ASSIZE RECORDS, ESSEX INDICTMENTS ELIZABETH 1, at 510 (J.S. Cockburn
ed., 1978); Indictment of Roland Meadow & Nicholas Gower, in CALENDAR OF ASSIZE
RECORDS, SUSSEX INDICTMENTS ELIZABETH 1, at 233 (J.S. Cockburn ed., 1975) (describing
a third party assault in 1590 on pregnant woman in which assailants stabbed victim and
slit open belly to remove unborn child); Indictment of Walter Beauvyleyn, in WILTSHIRE
GAOL DELIVERY AND TRAILBASTON TRIALS 1275-1306, at 131 (Ralph B. Pugh, ed., 1978)
(describing a 1305 third party assault that resulted in miscarriage); Inquest of the Death
of Lucy, Wife of Richard de Barstable, in CALENDAR OF CORONERS ROLLS OF THE CITY OF
LONDON A.D. 1300-1378, at 166 (Reginald R. Sharpe ed., 1963) (describing a 1326 third
party assault that resulted in death of mother and birth of an "abortive" child); Inquest
on the Death of Alice, Wife of Adam Cobel, in CALENDAR OF CORONERS ROLLS OF THE CITY
OF LONDON A.D. 1300-1378, at 21 (Reginald R. Sharpe ed., 1963) (describing third party
assault in 1301 on pregnant woman that resulted in her death and child's premature birth).
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Dellapenna designates these "abortion" cases and claims that their
prosecution showed the common law "treated abortion [i.e, the death
of the fetus resulting from assault on the woman] as a crime in prin-
ciple because it involved the killing of an unborn child.""0 ' To the
contrary, the law allowed women to bring appeals for three types of
injury: death of a husband, rape, and destruction of a fetus in her
womb.0 2 These appeals were allowed because such cases involved
graphic injury of a woman." 3 In modern terms, this right to bring an
appeal would be called standing.3 4 Thus, cases of assault involving
harmed fetuses were clearly not based on any personhood in the
fetus, but rather on harm to the woman's interest - one might even
say, the woman's personhood. In fact, the analogy with appeals for a
husband's death suggests the opposite - that the law deemed the
fetus to be part of the woman, as was the husband.0 5 The earliest
such case is Agnes's Appeal (1200):
Agnes, Saxe's daughter, appeals John of Paris, for that as she
was labouring with child he came into her house, and dragged her
out by the feet, and struck her with a stake so that she lost her
child. And he defends this as the others have done."°
Although Dellapenna calls this an "abortion case," 3 07 at the time it
clearly was not deemed one within the contemporary understanding
of the meaning of abortion. The Latin verb for "lost," perdidit, in the
last line makes clear that this case was about injury to the woman
rather than the death of the child. The case report fails to make any
reference to killing the child; rather it states the mother's loss as the
cause of action by making "her child," infantem suum, the verb's ob-
ject.30 ' From the transitive verb perdo, meaning to lose possession of,
perdidit means that the victim here is the woman who has been de-
prived of something - in this case, the infant. The past participle,
perdita, is the name of the lost daughter in Shakespeare's Winter's
301. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 135.
302. Id. at 131.
303. Id.
304. See BLACK'S LAWDICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "standing" as "[a] party's
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right").
305. See supra text accompanying notes 290-95.
306. SELDEN SOC'Y, 1 SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 39 (F.W. Maitland, ed., 1888)
[hereinafter SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN]. Dellapenna cites this source as well, but
offers a slightly different translation from the one appearing in the Select Pleas of the
Crown, without explanation. See DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 135.
307. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 135.
308. SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 306, at 39 (describing the injury as
having "lost her child').
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Tale, who is left out to die then found and raised by shepherds -
further evidence that the word means to lose possession of some-
thing, not to kill or murder. 0 9 Of course, the above record also offers
no support for the idea that pre-quickening destruction of a fetus was
criminal: the case obviously deals with a baby at the point of birth
("as she was labouring with child").31 °
Another case Dellapenna cites follows the same pattern:
Amice, who was the wife of Ralph Gundwine, appeals Adam
Warner, William Warner and Henry Warner that they came to the
house of her the said Amice and broke her house, and took her
the said Amice and beat her severely so that, by reason of that
beating, she the said Amice lost her child which was in her belly.
And that they did this to her wickedly and feloniously against the
peace ....
And the jurors say upon their oath that in truth the afore-
said Adam and others beat the aforesaid Amice; but they say that
she immediately went off, and walked about hither and thither,
and afterwards when eight days had elapsed she aborted a certain
child having the form of a male five inches long; but they believe
that this was rather due to the labor and foolish behavior of the
selfsame Amice than to the aforesaid beating.3 1
Again, the language makes clear that the injury the law recognized
was that to the woman for the loss of the child, and not for the de-
struction of the child itself.312 Moreover, the record describes the
aborted "child" as having the "form of a male,"313 which shows that
it was too early in the gestation process to be considered fully formed
as a human child. Furthermore, although many appeals were brought
against men who had assaulted women and caused abortions, almost
all these accused were acquitted,314 suggesting that even the acknowl-
edged injury to the woman was usually found either too hard to prove
or not serious enough for conviction.
An understanding of this appeals system suggests, and modern
scholars have also argued, that an injury to a fetus performed against
309. William J. Rolfe, Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER'S TALE 10,
40 (William J. Rolfe ed., Am. Book Co., 1898) (1623).
310. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 135; SELECT PLEAS OF THE CROWN, supra note 306,
at 39.
311. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 137.
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. See Schneebeck, supra note 191, at 234 (noting that none of the appeals brought
during the reign of Edward I resulted in a conviction).
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a woman's will can be recognized as a crime without granting person-
hood to a few-day-old embryo.315 For example, without addressing the
question of personhood, Celia Wells and Derek Morgan have argued
that a woman's interest in "ensuring the preservation of her foetus"
may be as compelling as her interest in determining whether her preg-
nancy is terminated.316 The early history of the common law supports
such an argument.
The second structural feature of early common law relevant to
this topic is the separation between private and public. While the
world of writs, appeals, indictments, and trials was largely a mas-
culine one,3 17 childbirth and pregnancy were almost entirely in the
hands of women. 1 ' Childbirth was attended by female "gossips" and
the female midwife, whose profession, until the seventeenth century,
was mostly closed to men.31 9 It was considered immodest for men to
touch or see women's "secrets." Nicholas Culpepper, author of a mid-
wifery manual, leaves out of his book any description of an actual
birth of a child, as he had admittedly never attended one.32° This was
true throughout the Middle Ages and into the seventeenth century
when men first began to make inroads into the profession of mid-
wifery.3 1' This female, private world was not one on which the com-
mon law trained its sights. This is not merely an issue of evidence and
proof. Although women could be implicated in crimes - for which
their husbands had to pay compensation - they had to enter the
masculine, public sphere to do so in a way that would register in the
legal system. 2 What occurred in the private world of birth and
conception did not.
C. Church Courts
With respect to abortion, Augustine, as noted above, and those
who followed him, distinguished between the abortion of a fetus of
less than forty days, before God gave it a soul, and one older than
forty days.323 It is important to distinguish between canonists and
315. See, e.g., DELLAPENNA supra note 3, at 139; see also Schneebeck, supra note 191,
at 233.
316. Celia Wells & Derek Morgan, Whose Foetus Is It?, 18 J.L. & Soc'y 431,431 (1991).
317. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 46.
318. Hobby, supra note 151, at xvi. Midwife manuals, by contrast, were generally
written by men, an important fact to keep in mind when analyzing their contents. See
supra text accompanying notes 151-57.
319. Id. at xi, xiv.
320. See id. at xviii.
321. See id. at xvi-xix.
322. See DURSTON, supra note 18, at 46.
323. DICKENS, supra note 44, at 15; SHAHAR, supra note 120, at 124.
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theologians in this context; the view of theologians was severe toward
contraception and abortion, while canonists, expressing approved
Church doctrine, espoused more leniency, mandating years of penance
for contraception and abortion alike.324 There are, however, no Church
court records of women being convicted for having abortions in the
contemporary sense.325 Moreover, although self-induced abortion may
have come under ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the official list of "Causes"
for the Church to adjudicate contains no reference to the self-induced
abortion.32 I will examine below the few examples of prosecutions.327
Destruction of a fetus could fall under ecclesiastical jurisdiction
in a number of ways and secular courts also trying such cases did not
preclude ecclesiastical jurisdiction.328 The fact that the destruction of
a fetus by a woman herself could fall under ecclesiastical jurisdiction32
has two implications. While early moderns did not consistently sepa-
rate the idea of sin from the idea of crime, modern legal systems do,
and it is important not to inappropriately transfer religious notions
of wrong into legal notions that are relevant today. If the Church -
and this is a complicated question which I will address below 330 -
condemned abortion, it also banned as sinful throwing snowballs in
churchyards. 331 The fact that a thing was banned under Church law
does not create a basis for banning it under modern notions of crime
in common law;332 even at the time, there was limited support, at least
in post-Reformation England, for "secular involvement in moral
offenses."333 Many texts used to bolster the idea that abortion was
a crime in the medieval and early modern period are relevant only
to Church courts and doctrines. Thus, although anti-choice writers
criticize Blackmun for "ignoring" ecclesiastical law in Roe, 334 there
is some basis for leaving it out of discussions of the history of the
common law approach to abortion.
324. SHAHAR, supra note 120, at 124.
325. Id.
326. THOMAS OUGHTON, ORDO JUDICIORUM 42-60 (1738).
327. See cases cited infra notes 369-74.
328. OUGHTON, supra note 326, at 42.
329. DICKENS, supra note 44, at 20.
330. See infra text accompanying notes 355-74.
331. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 174-77. I wish to thank Paula Dalley for this
suggestion.
332. R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 167 n.44 (1987) [herein-
after CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND] ("It is certainly permissible to argue...
that American courts are not bound to accept the ecclesiastical law as part of the English
Common Law as received in the United States.").
333. DURSTON, supra note 18, at 175.
334. Dennis J. Horan & Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in History,
Law, or Logic, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: REVERSING ROE V. WADE THROUGH
THE COURTS 57, 64-65 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987).
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The difference between secular and ecclesiastical punishments
is also telling of the separation between the two. The punishments
the Church courts imposed were public penance - a humiliating
ritual designed to reconcile the offender to God and the community as
well as discourage misdeeds - and possible excommunication, but not
the corporal punishment the state meted out for non-secular crime
such as murder and assault." 5 While it would be anachronistic to
assume that spiritual punishments were less effective than corporal
ones at this time,3 ' a relegation of self-induced abortion to Church
courts indicates first, that they were not considered murder, and,
second, that they were not regarded as disturbances of the king's
peace. Most canonists agreed that Church jurisdiction was based on
the purpose of the jurisdiction: if it was to impose punishment, it was
left to the secular courts; if the purpose was to correct and impose
penance, jurisdiction fell to the Church courts. 7 Conversely, from at
least the twelfth century, secular courts increasingly asserted sole
jurisdiction over what they considered serious crimes.338
There is another important distinction between spiritual and
secular punishment relevant to this discussion. The Church imposed
sanctions in order to restore the sinner's spiritual health and to re-
store him or her to the community of faith, not simply to punish.339
In Helmholz's words, these sanctions were "medicinal, not punitive."' °
In a broader sense, secular and Church courts had different functions
in prosecuting transgression; rather than trying issues of fact, as did
secular courts, ecclesiastical courts served as an opportunity for the
public clearing of the name of the accused and for mediation of dis-
putes, with restoring peace between the parties serving as the ulti-
mate goal.34' Often, it was private parties who invoked the Church
courts' jurisdiction over secular crimes, and they seem to have done
so when the secular courts offered inadequate remedies, as in the case
of attempted crimes, or infanticide.342
The nature of the crime also determined jurisdiction. State courts
had jurisdiction over cases of violence (actions which broke the king's
335. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 2; INGRAM, supra note
63, at 3.
336. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 3 (observing that "no
sanctions, spiritual or secular, were terribly effective in the Middle Ages" and that
"spiritual sanctions seem... to have been ... no more ineffectiveo than were the threats
of the King's ministers").
337. Id. at 124.
338. Id. at 125.
339. Id. at 106.
340. Id. at 107.
341. Id. at 138.
342. Id. at 143.
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peace) and cases involving property, specifically, therefore, forms of
murder and theft.343 The Church jurisdiction relevant to our purposes
was over moral and spiritual matters, such as marriage, adultery and
other sexual trespasses, and witchcraft.344 If the Church prosecuted
cases for self-induced abortions, they would appear under these juris-
dictional headings.345 Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over abortion thus in-
dicates that it was not regarded as murder, or as a threat to the peace
and order of the community. 46 Beginning with Henry II, Angevin
rulers had aggressively taken jurisdiction of such matters into state
hands; the Assizes of Clarendon of 1166 provided an early example
of this impulse.347 This trend represented a determined assertion of
the crown over the role of enforcing the king's peace and upholding
public order.
3 41
As a final jurisdictional matter, it is important to distinguish
between abortion in the public realm, that is, abortion as enabler and
sign of illicit sexual activity, and abortion in the private realm, that is,
abortion as a private matter within a marriage. Church courts "made
virtually no effort to punish.., sexual irregularities which took place
between husband and wife in the marriage-bed." 3 49 Before the Refor-
mation, these matters, if addressed at all, came to light in the context
of confession, but after annual confession was abolished as a require-
ment, the Church made no real effort to bring them into its purview.35°
I suggest that this hands-off approach to the nascent private sphere
is a structural feature that Church courts shared with the common
law courts and that has implications for the regulation of abortion.
As the cases below will show, Church court abortion cases that were
not third party assault cases generally involved unmarried women
and illicit sex.351 For reasons I will discuss, they most likely did not
involve married women. This lacuna corresponds to a feature of the
common law, that is, its apparent willingness to leave private matters
between husband and wife outside of its scope.
Dellapenna asserts first that "[t]he ecclesiastical authorities pros-
ecuted [ingestive] abortions fairly routinely as witchcraft." 352 The one
343. R.H. HELMHOLz, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND 56 (1990) [herein-
after ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND].
344. INGRAM, supra note 63, at 2-3; see id. at 4.
345. See INGRAM, supra note 63, at 2-3.
346. See CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 125.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. INGRAM, supra note 63, at 239-40.
350. Id. at 240.
351. See infra text accompanying notes 369, 371.
352. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 152.
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Assize case - not a Church court case - he cites fails to support his
argument for any kind of abortion prosecution; rather it is a simple
assault case, albeit an assault allegedly conducted through witchcraft.
In 1580, Jane Turnour, spinster:
[M]aliciously and devilishly bewitched and enchanted a certain
Helen Sparrowe, wife of John Sparrowe, . . .being then great with
a certain living child, by reason whereof not only was the same
Helen then and there on various occasions gravely vexed in her
body horribly troubled, to the greatest danger of her life, but also
the aforesaid child (of which the same Helen was then and there
great) then and there came to death.353
The language "great with a certain living child" suggests that the fetus
was far past quickening, and indeed, the record's emphasis on the fact
that the child was "living" suggests that this status was not a given
attribute of a fetus.3" Finally, of course, the most important point here
is that this is not a case of self-induced abortion, but a case of assault,
in the same category as other assault cases resulting in fetal death.
Of the few relevant prosecutions for fetal destruction in Church
courts, most present the same facts, i.e., assault by a third party, that
underlay appeals discussed earlier."' Indeed, it is likely that the
injured woman herself brought these cases, as most cases in eccle-
siastical courts were brought by parties involved rather than by the
authorities.356 Victims of these assaults may have chosen ecclesiastical
courts in hopes of being taken more seriously: secular courts often dis-
missed women's appeals even if they were technically correct.357 For
example, in 1487, John Wren was charged in a Church court "with
having wounded his wife during the time she was pregnant so that he
killed the child in her belly." 358 In 1471, Thomas Deneham of Minster
was prosecuted in the diocese of Canterbury because, knowing his
"wife to be pregnant, he imposed such inordinate labors on her that
353. DELLAPENNA, supra note 3, at 182. The cite Dellapenna gives for this text is not
a part of the regular Assize records, and I have been unable to find it. I take his quote
in faith. The Assize record for this case is as follows: "[oln 8 Jan. 1580 and on other
occasions before and since [Joan Turnour, spelled Turnor here] bewitched Ellen wife of
John Sparrowe, being great with child, so that she died." CALENDAR OF ASSIZE RECORDS,
ESSEX INDICTMENTS ELIZABETH 1, supra note 300, at 212. Obviously, this record presents
the case differently: as a case of murder of Helen/Ellen through alleged witchcraft, with the
death of the fetus incident to the death of the mother.
354. Id.
355. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159.
356. See HUDSON, supra note 274, at 70.
357. See infra text accompanying notes 358-59.
358. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159 (internal quotes
omitted).
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she aborted."' 59 The language of these cases also sheds light on the
question of quickening. For example, the first case uses the word
puerum to describe the child that was killed.36° This word, meaning
boy, 61 suggests a relatively advanced stage of fetal development.
Despite Helmholz's assertion that these "records show no evidence
of dispute about the time of 'quickening' of the fetus,"3 62 1 suggest that
the word puer itself indicates a fetus developed to the point when its
gender could be discerned. Other words were available, such asproles
and infantum, to refer to a neuter, and thus less developed, form.363 In
the Deneham case, the word gravidam has similar implications: the
Latin literally states that the mother was heavy with child (inpreg-
natam et gravidam).3 64 Again, this phrasing suggests an advanced
pregnancy. The authorities prosecuting and recording the case took
the post-quickening state of the infant for granted, I suggest, and did
not think it needed mentioning when words like puer and gravidam
make it obvious.
Finally, the Church's enforcement of sexual mores was closely
related to the fear of disorder in society at large - and cost to the
parish itself.365 Parish officers did their best to prevent the marriages
of people deemed likely to become charges on the parish: Ingram re-
ports that the minister of Nether Compton wrote in 1628 that a poor
woman "hath no house nor home of her own and very like to bring
charge on the parish, and therefore will hardly be suffered to marry
in our parish." 366 Any concern the Church courts may have expressed
over abortion probably reflects this preoccupation with the social and
economic impact on the community. The sixteenth century saw in-
creasing Puritan demand for harsher punishment of sexual offenses,
a task much more likely to fall to the Church than to secular authori-
ties.36' The few records of such cases are consistent with a concern
about sexual morality and abortion as enabling illicit sex, more than
with abortion itself.3 6' For example, George Hemery was charged in
359. Id.
360. Id. at 159 n.10.
361. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 92, at 1514-15 (definingpuer as "[a] non-
adult male, boy," noting puerum as the plural).
362. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159 n.14.
363. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 92, at 894 (defining infans as "[a]n infant,
little child (strictly, one not yet able to talk)'); id. at 1482 (definingproles as "[t]hat which
springs from a person (animal, etc.) by birth or descent, offspring, progeny").
364. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159 n. 11.
365. INGRAM, supra note 63, at 125-31.
366. Id. at 131.
367. See id. at 151, 154 (attributing the Puritan demand in part to "theological changes
which stressed the depravity of man" and the belief that sexual misconduct was "rife and
largely condoned by popular standards").
368. See HOFFER & HULL, supra note 48, at 154-55 (discussing the use of abortion to
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the Consistory court of Rochester in 1493 with giving a woman a
medicinal drink "in order to destroy the boy he had procreated." 369 The
Latin indicates that the boy was "procreated" outside of marriage:
rather than referring to the child simply as puerum (or infantem)
suum, "his child," which would have been the conventional usage, the
recorder went to the trouble of explaining that the child in question
was procreatum per ipsum, "procreated by him." 37 0 Similarly, in the
case of the servant Joan Gibbes, charged in 1469 with having "killed
the infant lately in her womb by means of herbs and medicines," 
371
the record hints that she was unmarried. First, most servants set up
their own households when they became married,3 72 and second, the
record fails to give the accused's last name, also indicating unmar-
ried status.373 Finally, as discussed supra, outside authorities were
much more likely to have information about the pregnancy -
"lately in her womb" - of a servant than of a married woman.374
Helmholz suggests that plaintiffs may have chosen to pursue
cases of assaults causing fetal loss in ecclesiastical courts because
Church courts were more likely to take these actions seriously. 375 The
king's courts seem to have regarded them as less heinous than other
forms of crime.37 6 I add to this that the mere fact such cases were
brought at all indicates that quickening had occurred, and that the
prosecution of these cases in Church courts reflects the same trend
I have tried to show in the royal courts - namely, that the underlying
concern was with social order, and that cases brought for assault re-
sulting in the death of the fetus are properly seen as assault cases,
not abortion cases in the contemporary sense of the terms.
Finally, to conclude this section, I suggest that the relationship
between Church teachings, Church courts, and the stuff of daily life
is best illustrated by a work of literature.377 While canon law and
Church courts may have condemned abortion at some stage of preg-
nancy, people understood, as they do now, religious precepts to apply
conceal extramarital pregnancy).
369. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159.
370. Compare id. at 159 n.12, with id. at 159 n.10 (contrasting with the phrase uxorem
suam, which means "his wife," in the Wren case).
371. Id. at 159.
372. SHAHAR, supra note 120, at 225 ('Among peasants ... marriage ... symbolized the
transition to the new status of householders.").
373. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 159.
374. See infra text accompanying note 165.
375. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 167 n.44.
376. Id.
377. See GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES: NINE TALES AND THE GENERAL
PROLOGUE (V.A. Kolve ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1989) (1388-1400).
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to matters of the soul and salvation, while the common law regulated
everyday life. Geoffrey Chaucer's Canterbury Tales3 78 illustrates this
relationship perfectly. It paints a panorama of contemporary life full
of bawdry, fornication, greed, and betrayal,3 7' and concludes with the
somber warnings of the "Parson's Tale," which, most scholars agree,
represent Chaucer's sober reflections as he faced his own death.' The
pilgrims' tales, as most of us recall, run the gamut of illicit behavior."'
The "Miller's Tale" depicts an adulterous couple who use the story of
Noah's Ark to trick the woman's husband into falling asleep so they
can spend the night "in bisinesse of mirthe and of solas [pleasure]" 382;
the Wife of Bath tells of her five husbands and questions Church
teaching that she "sholde wedded be but ones";3 3 the Knight tells of
pagans who wage war for love;"s and the Cook tells of an apprentice
who frequents bars and brothels.3"5 The final "Parson's Tale" strikes
a different note from most of the others (indeed, most editions leave it
out).38 ' Rather than telling a story, the Parson grimly calls on sinners
to repent and warns against the seven deadly sins.38 7 Among other
evils humans commit, he mentions abortion:
[I]f a woman have conceyved, and hurt hirself and sleeth the
child, yet is it homycide.3s
The Parson's creed is a fitting finale to the tales of the pilgrims on
their way to Canterbury. Just as they represent all walks of life and
the panoply of human foibles and errors on the way to salvation, now,
near the end of their journey as they approach the holy shrine, he
reminds them of the summing up and reckoning at the end of life.38 9
His message is the necessity of repentance as the end draws near:
378. Id.
379. Arthur W. Hoffman, Chaucer's Prologue to Pilgrimage: The Two Voices, in
GEOFFREY CHAUCER, supra note 377, at 459-60.
380. Larry D. Benson, The Canon and Chronology of Chaucer's Works, in THE RIVERSIDE
CHAUCER xxvi, xxix (Larry D. Benson ed., Houghton Mifflin 3d ed. 1987) (1388-1400);
Martin M. Crow & Virginia E. Leland, Chaucer's Life, in The Riverside Chaucer, supra
note 380, at xv, xvi.
381. JillMann, Characterization and Moral Judgment in the General Prologue Portraits,
in GEOFFREY CHAUCER, supra note 377, at 471, 474.
382. CHAUCER, supra note 377, at 88.
383. Id. at 105.
384. Id. at 44-45.
385. THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER, supra note 380, at 85.
386. Mann, supra note 381, at 472.
387. THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER, supra note 385, at 288-89, 299.
388. Id. at 306.
389. Id. at 288.
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Manye been the weyes espirituels that leden folk to oure Lord
Jhesu Crist and to the regne of glorie.
Of whiche weyes ther is a ful noble wey and a ful covenable, which
may nat fayle to man ne to womman that thurgh synne hath
mysgoon fro the righte wey of Jerusalem celestial;
and this wey is cleped Penitence, of which man sholde gladly
herknen and enquere with al his herte .... "'
Chaucer himself expresses repentance at the end of the work in his
Retraction - not only for writing the Tales, but for all his other works
which may have offended God, including Troilus and Criseyde, The
Book of the Duchess, the Book of the Ladies, and, just in case, "many
a song and many a leccherous lay" he may have forgotten."'
The relationship between the preceding Tales on the one hand,
and the "Parson's Tale" and "Chaucer's Retraction" on the other, helps
us understand the relationship between the moral precepts of the
Church and everyday life, and, by extension, the role of the Church
courts. It is fitting that as the pilgrims approach their destination, the
shrine of Thomas a'Becket at Canterbury, and as Chaucer himself
approached the end of his life, both turn from the realities of the every-
day to thoughts of "the blisse of hevene" 392 and how to achieve it. In
this light, it is worth noting that Thomas a'Becket was martyred in the
struggle between Henry II and the Church over Church jurisdiction
over serious crimes - a struggle that Henry ultimately won. 93
CONCLUSION
An examination of the culture surrounding the act of abortion
in early modern England has much to offer. Indeed, I suggest that
the law is impossible to understand without an understanding of the
social and cultural meaning of the act and the legal texts referring
to it, and arguments that ignore this content are doomed to draw an
incomplete and misleading picture. Unfortunately, abortion is the kind
of topic that attracts this kind of distorted analysis; Dellapenna's book
is a glaring example. An examination of abortion law in its full context
reveals that the doctrine does not lend itself to absolutist statements
such as the ones Dellapenna makes. It does seem clear, however, that
the penalties for abortion in the common law had to do with injuries
to the woman carrying the fetus and to the putative father, not with
390. Id.
391. Id. at 328.
392. See THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER, supra note 380, at 315.
393. CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND, supra note 332, at 125.
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injury to the fetus as a person.3" Further, beliefs about man's capacity
for reason and ensoulment make it unlikely that the pre-quickening
fetus was deemed to possess the same human status as the fetus after
quickening."' Medical culture and notions of the body made early
miscarriage such a nebulous category that there was little distinction
between miscarriage of an embryo and other kinds of dissolution.396
The structure of the common law was not designed to intervene in
the sphere in which intra-marital abortions occurred.397 Finally, the
records of the time, including literature, pamphlets, manuals, laws,
and cases, indicate that the concern underlying most abortion stat-
utes and cases was about social disorder and illicit sex.398 Authorities
saw abortion differently depending on who performed it under what
circumstances.399 These contextual elements are a necessary part of
the legal history of abortion.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98, 290-316.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 261-64.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 33-47, 120-43.
397. See supra text accompanying notes 265-98, 317-22.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 48-114.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 82-98.
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